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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the _Case 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Karsten argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to set aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of 
conviction. This brief is necessary to address the State's argument that Ms. ~<arsten's 
appeal is moot. Additionally, this brief is necessary to address the State's claim that 
Ms. Karsten's interpretation of !.C. § 19-2604(1) is inconsistent with Idaho precedent. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Karsten's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to set aside Ms. Karsten's guilty 
plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Set Aside Ms. Karsten's 
Guilt Plea And Dismiss Her Jud ment Of Conviction 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Ms. Karsten's appeal is moot 
because I.C. § 19-2604 was amended after the district court denied her request to set 
aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5, 
7-9.) Since the district court told Ms. Karsten that it would entertain a second motion in 
the event I.C. § 19-2604 was amended, the State argues that her appeal is moot 
because there is potential relief available to her under the amended statute. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5, 7-9.) In support of this argument the State cites to Idaho 
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity By and Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Educ. By and Through Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282 (1996), for the proposition that 
"actions which challenge the validity or the manner of implementation of a statute or 
regulation are often mooted because the provision has been repealed, amended or 
revised." However, the State fails to acknowledge that the Eikum Opinion goes on to 
hold that "actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is 
not removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties' 
claims." Id. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the amendment of I.C. § 19-2604 did not 
remove the controversy or otherwise resolve the issue on appeal. Ms. Karsten's appeal 
would only be moot if the relief she is requesting was available under the current 
version of I.C. § 19-2604. The relevant portion of the version of I.C. § 19-2604, which 
was applicable at the time of Ms. Karsten's motion to set aside her guilty plea and 
vacate her judgment of conviction follows: 
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(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been 
withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing 
that: 
the court may, if convinced b v the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuin the eriod of robation and if it be com atible with 
the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the 
defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the 
custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" 
for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. 
LC.§ 19-2604(1) (emphasis added). The current version of I.C. § 19-2604(1) provides: 
(1 )(a) Application for relief under this subsection may be made by the 
following persons who have pied guilty to or been found guilty of a crime: 
the court, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause 
for continuing the period of probation should the defendant be on 
probation at the time of the application1 and that there is good cause for 
granting the requested relief, may terminate the sentence or set aside the 
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case 
and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction 
from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement 
in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to sentencing, and 
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) (emphasis added). The only relevant difference between the older 
version of I.C. § 19-2604 and the current version of I.C. § 19-2604, is that the phrase 
"should the defendant be on probation at the time of the application," is added to the 
current version. However, this amendment has not removed the controversy. In fact, 
Justice Eismann has interpreted the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 in a manner which 
would preclude Ms. Karsten from obtaining the relief she is currently seeking on appeal. 
State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521,529 n.3 (2013) ("We note that this year the legislature 
amended section 19-2604 to expressly provide for relief after the period of probation 
4 
has expired, although the relief granted is only the reduction of a felony to a 
misdemeanor."). 
The reiief Ms. Karsten is seeking is available under both versions of LC. § 19-
2604. However, that relief will require an appellate court to interpret I.C. § 19-2604 in 
the manner for which Ms. Karsten is advocating in her Appellant's Brief, to wit, that the 
word "and" followed by a comma creates an ambiguity because the "and" could either 
be conjunctive or disjunctive. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13.) As such, the State's 
argument that Ms. Karsten's appeal is moot is without merit. 
The State also argues that Ms. Karsten's interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604 is 
contrary to Idaho precedent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) As mentioned above, 
Ms. Karsten argued: 
The underlined portion of the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), sets 
forth two circumstances under which relief is available because the use of 
a comma before the word "and" indicates that the two clauses function 
independently of each other. The first clause applies if the movant is 
currently on probation. The second clause applies if the movant's 
probation has expired. If the legislature intended both of the clauses to be 
an indivisible unit, then it would not have separated the two clauses with a 
comma. Further, reading the two clauses as an indivisible unit requires 
this Court to ignore the comma. As such, the use of the comma after the 
word "and" indicates that the first two clauses of the last paragraph of I.C. 
§ 19-2604(1) signifies two separate circumstances under which relief is 
available. 
" (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The State does not refute the logic behind Ms. Karsten's 
argument instead it just cites to Guess, supra, and points to the interpretation of 
I.C. § 19-2604 addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court and subsequent Court of 
Appeals' Opinions which cite Guess. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) However, the 
State does not even address Ms. Karsten's contention that I.C. § 19-2604 is ambiguous 
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and that the rule of lenity requires this Court to adopt her interpretation of the statute. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) 
As a final point, Ms. Karsten's argument, that the word "and" functions as a 
disjunctive, was recently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Brooks, 
157 Idaho 890 (Ct. App. 2014 ). In that case, Brooks was pulled over for failing to 
signaling for five second prior to changing lanes on a controlled access highway. Id. at 
891. The police officer thought this was a violation of I.C. § 49-808(2). Id. While talking 
with Brooks, the officer smelled marijuana and noticed what appeared to be 
methamphetamine. Id. 
Brooks filed a suppression motion, arguing that I.C. § 49-808(2) does not require 
him to signal for five second before changing a lane on a controlled access highway. Id. 
Idaho Code Section 49-808(2) follows: 
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, 
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning. 
I .C. § 49-808(2) ( emphasis added). "Brooks argue(d] that the plain meaning of the word 
'and' is exclusively to conjoin two ideas, leading to [the] interpretation that the italicized 
portion of the statute requires signaling for at least five seconds only when a vehicle is 
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway." Id. at 892. 
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding: 
The "and" at issue in this statute joins together two independent 
prepositional phrases-" [o]n controlled-access highways" and " before 
turning from a parked position"-each of which individually modifies the 
remainder of the sentence to indicate when a five-second signal is 
required. If the legislature had intended Brooks's proposed interpretation, 
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it couid have eliminated the "and" entirely and simply written that, "before 
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway, the signal 
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." 
Id. at 892-893. Similarly, the applicable version of I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), has two 
independent clauses conjoined by a comma and the word "and," which indicates that 
each clause independently modifies the remainder of the sentence. It should also be 
noted that Brooks filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was 
denied on February 9, 2015. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court recently referred to 
address the Court of Appeals' holding in Brooks. 
In sum, Ms. Karsten's appeal is not moot because the recent amendment to I.C. 
§ 19-2604 did not resolve the controversy on appeal. Additionally, Ms. Karsten's 
interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604 is consistent with recent Court of Appeals' precedent, 
which was not changed or amendeed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Karsten respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings with instructions that her guilty plea be set aside and her judgment of 
conviction be dismissed. 
DATED this 2th day of March, 2015. 
~---; 1 /_ v----
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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